Storeable Votes: Giving Voice to Minority Preferences Without Sacrificing Efficiency by Casella, Alessandra et al.
CESifo DICE Report 3/200717
Forum
STORABLE VOTES: GIVING
VOICE TO MINORITY
PREFERENCES WITHOUT
SACRIFICING EFFICIENCY*
ALESSANDRA CASELLA**,
THOMAS PALFREY*** AND
RAYMOND RIEZMAN****
The principle of majority rule is the foundation ofdemocratic constitutions, but provides an imme-
diate and fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of
any government that the constitution empowers: the
risk of excluding minority groups from representation.
At least since Madison, Mill, and Tocqueville, political
thinkers have argued that a necessary condition for
the legitimacy of a democratic system is for no group
with socially acceptable goals to be disenfranchised. In
the history of constitutional law, ensuring fair repre-
sentation to each group is seen as the crucial second
step in the evolution of democratic institutions, after
granting the franchise: once all individuals are guaran-
teed the right to participate in the political process, the
problem remains how to assign appropriate weights to
each group’s political interest. The core of the difficul-
ty is that the two goals seem inherently contradictory.
One remedy is recourse to the judiciary system: basic
rights can be guaranteed in the fundamental laws of
the country, and the courts can be appealed to when
such rights are imperiled. But protecting a political
minority when its rights are threatened does not
address the subtler problem of ensuring that its pref-
erences are sufficiently represented. For this, the cor-
rect design of political institutions is required. In our
work, we approach the problem from the perspec-
tive of voting theory, and propose a simple voting
mechanism that, without violating the basic principle
of “one-person one-vote”, allows the minority to win
occasionally. The mechanism is not based on super-
majorities, avoiding the costs of inertia and ineffi-
ciency they can entail, nor on geographical parti-
tions, with the inevitable arbitrariness and instability
of redistricting. In addition, although the mecha-
nism’s main property is its ability to protect minori-
ties, and thus to increase fairness and legitimacy, it
does so without sacrificing efficiency.
A simple example will make our words more trans-
parent, but precision is important and we must begin
with some definitions. We define a minority as a
clearly identifiable group characterized by two fea-
tures: first, a small relative size; second, preferences
that are systematically different from the prefer-
ences of the majority. Thus, a minority in our discus-
sion is a political minority, which may, but need not,
correspond to a minority according to racial, ethnic,
religious or other types of non-political group iden-
tity. In terms of political decisions, what matters are
the coherent and idiosyncratic policy preferences of
the group, independent of the source of its identity.
Consider then the following example.
A polity comprised of 100 citizens has two (political)
groups, with 55 members in Group A and 45 in
group B. Three proposals are being considered. All
citizens in group A have identical preferences and
strictly prefer to pass all proposals; all citizens in
group B have identical preferences and strictly pre-
fer the status quo on all three issues. Thus, group B
fits our definition of a minority. Suppose that the
utility each citizen receives from each alternative is
as given in Table 1, with the utility of the less pre-
ferred option normalized to 0.
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Table 1
Issue UA(pass) UA(sq) UB(pass) UB(sq) 
1 3 0 0 1 
2 2 0 0 2 
3 1 0 0 3 
Note that the intensity of preferences varies across
the issues. That is, some issues are “more important”
to one group than to the other group – issue 1 is
important to group A but not to group B, and issue 3
is important to group B but not to group A.
Now consider what would happen with simple
majority rule when issues are decided independent-
ly: since group A has a majority, all three proposals
pass. Indeed, as long as preferences are perfectly cor-
related within groups, then even if there were a mil-
lion different issues, group A would always have a
majority on all issues, so the B citizens are effective-
ly disenfranchised – the outcome is exactly the same
as it would be in a political system where only A cit-
izens were allowed to vote.
Why is this situation undesirable? First, a formally
open franchise is meaningless if the outcomes are
equivalent to what would arise if political access
were denied to one of the groups. If one considers
outcomes as well as process, then equity considera-
tions demand that political minorities be able to win
on at least some issues. Moreover, from a purely util-
itarian standpoint, the outcomes described above are
socially inefficient according to widely accepted wel-
fare criteria. In our example, if each individual is
treated equally and decisions are evaluated ex ante,
before membership into the groups is known, the
status quo should prevail on issue 3. Thus letting the
majority prevail on all issues has costs both in terms
of equity and in terms of ex ante efficiency: the equi-
ty problem stems from the existence of a smaller
group whose members’ preferences are systemati-
cally opposed to the members of the larger group;
the efficiency problem stems from differences in the
intensity of preferences of the two groups. This fail-
ure of simple majority rule is often referred to as
“the tyranny of the majority”.1
How can the failure be avoided, or at least mitigat-
ed? An immediate answer may be that, in practice,
vote trading and logrolling schemes produce out-
comes responsive to different intensities of prefer-
ences and thereby improve efficiency: members of
one group could trade their vote on one issue in
exchange for votes on other issues. But in our simple
example, vote trading and logrolling by itself will not
change the outcomes: citizens in group A already
win on all issues, so B members have nothing to
trade. An explicit institution “re-enfranchising” the
minority is necessary.
But note that this institution cannot be a superma-
jority or unanimity requirement for passing any pro-
posal: it would result in maintaining the status quo in
all issues, an outcome that is worse than simple
majority voting on both equity and efficiency
grounds. Any solution must deviate from issue-by-
issue simple majority voting.
Consider then endowing every voter with an initial
stock of votes, and rather than requiring voters to
cast exactly one vote on each issue, allowing them to
lump their votes together, casting “heavier” votes on
some issues and “lighter” votes on other issues. It is
this voting mechanism, called storable votes, that we
study in our work. If decisions are made according to
the majority of votes cast (as opposed to the majori-
ty of voters), storable votes allow the minority to win
some of the time, and in particular, to win when its
preferences are most intense. And because the
majority generally holds more votes, it is in a posi-
tion to overrule the minority if it cares to do so: the
minority can win only those issues over which its
strength of preferences is high and, at the same time,
the majority’s preference intensity is weak. But these
are exactly the issues where the minority “should”
win from an efficiency viewpoint: the equity gains
resulting from the possibility of occasional minori-
ty’s victory need not come at a cost to aggregate effi-
ciency. Nor does the representation of minority’s
preferences come at the expense of the equal treat-
ment of all voters: all individuals are granted the
same number of votes and all votes count equally.2
Thus the scheme need not be redesigned if the size,
or the very existence, of the minority changes.
In fact, even without systematically opposed prefer-
ences, the use of storable votes can increase efficien-
cy in symmetrical voting environments, where no
systematic minority exists.3 When a voter bunches
his votes on his highest intensity issues, the probabil-
ity of obtaining his desired outcome shifts away from
decisions that matter little to that voter and towards
decisions that matter more, with positive welfare
consequences. The value of a storable votes mecha-
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1 Nothing fundamental depends on all citizens in a group having
the same intensity of preferences on every issue, or even on the
direction of preferences within the group being perfectly correlat-
ed. The same problem exists with imperfect correlation and het-
erogeneity of intensities within groups.
2 Many variations that we have not studied are also possible, includ-
ing the granting of different numbers of votes to different individuals.
3 Casella (2005).
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nism in the presences of minorities is even more
compelling because, in addition to the efficiency
gains, it addresses fundamental considerations of
equity and legitimacy.
An existing voting system that resembles storable
votes is cumulative voting, a mechanism used in
multi-candidate elections. It grants each voter a bud-
get of votes, with the proviso that the votes can be
spread or concentrated on as many or as few of the
candidates as the voter wishes.The winner is the can-
didate who receives the most votes. In the United
States, cumulative voting is used commonly in cor-
porate elections, with the explicit goal of making it
possible for minority shareholders to elect members
to the board of directors (Williams 1951). In political
elections, cumulative voting was used from 1870 to
1980 to elect representatives to the state House in
Illinois; has been advocated more generally for the
protection of minority rights (Guinier 1994) and has
been imposed by the courts to redress violations of
fair representation in local elections (Issacharoff,
Karlan and Pildes 2002). There is evidence – theo-
retical (Cox 1990), experimental (Gerber, Morton
and Rietz 1998), and empirical (Pildes and Do-
noghue 1995, Bowler, Donovan and Brockington
2003) – that cumulative voting does indeed help
minorities.4 The storable votes mechanism differs
from cumulative voting because it applies to a col-
lection of independent binary decisions – a series of
proposals, each of which can pass or fail – as opposed
to a single multi-candidate election, but the motiva-
tion is similar.
Experimental evidence
The desirable properties of storable votes are features
of the equilibrium of the resulting voting game: they
emerge if every voter chooses the correct number of
votes, given what he rationally expects others to do.
But could the outcome be much worse if voters made
mistakes? This is an appropriate concern here because
the storable votes game is quite complex: voters need
to trade-off the different probabilities of casting the
pivotal vote along the full logical tree of possible sce-
narios, a task further complicated by coordination
problems within the two groups, and multiple equilib-
ria. If actual voters were confronted with the problem,
what type of decisions would they make? 
To answer this question, in 2004 and 2005 we ran a
number of laboratory experiments at Caltech,
UCLA and Princeton University where subjects
recruited from campus were asked to vote over a
sequence of elections in five-person committees,
with storable votes. In each experimental session, a
committee faced two consecutive proposals. Three
members of the committee (the majority group)
earned a monetary reward whenever a proposal
failed; two others (the minority group) if it passed.
The composition of the two groups was constant
over the two proposals, mimicking a systematic
minority that would always lose with simple majori-
ty voting.
Immediately before each proposal was voted on,
each voter was assigned a random value between
1 and 100 which translated directly into the mone-
tary reward, inducing a voter’s intensity of prefer-
ence, as in the theoretical model.5 Although group
membership was known to everyone in the group,
the intensities were private information. We consid-
ered two treatments regarding the distribution of
preference intensity within a group, representing
stronger or weaker group cohesion.
In the first case, as in the example in Table 1, all mem-
bers of a group had identical intensity and agreed not
only on the preferred direction of the proposal, but
also on priorities across the two proposals. We called
this treatment C, as in “correlated intensities”. In the
second case, intensities were drawn independently,
and members of a group agreed on the direction of
preferences but not necessarily on the strength of
their preferences. We called this treatment B, the
“base” treatment. In both cases, intensities were inde-
pendent across groups, so members of one group were
uncertain about the intensities in the other group.
Everyone was always informed of the statistical
process by which intensities were assigned.
Each subject had one standard vote to cast over
each proposal and a total of two bonus votes to
spend as desired, either dividing them over the two
proposals or cumulating both over a single propos-
al. The outcome was determined by majority rule,
with ties broken randomly. After each round of two
proposals, another round started with two new pro-
posals and a new endowment of bonus votes, and
intensities were reassigned. This was repeated for
4 There is even a blog on cumulative voting:
http://www.fairvote.org. 5 See Smith (1976) for an explanation of induced value theory.
15 to 30 rounds. We ran 11 experimental sessions
with a total of 167 students.6
In both treatments, theory predicts that minority
members should always cumulate their bonus votes
on a single proposal: on the first proposal if the inten-
sity attached to it is at least 50, and on the second oth-
erwise. The threshold is 50 because 50 is the expected
intensity over the second proposal. The same is true
for a majority member in treatment B. However, in
treatment C the equilibrium has the majority collec-
tively casting 5 votes on the first proposal if its inten-
sity is below 50, and 7 otherwise. Since neither 5 nor 7
is divisible by 3, there is no simple symmetric individ-
ual strategy that produces this total: different majori-
ty voters must use different strategies, a difficult coor-
dination problem. To see whether the coordination
problem affected the results, we designed two varia-
tions of the C treatment: in one we allowed subjects to
chat electronically with other members of their own
group; in the second, we let a single subject represent
an entire group, and thus rephrased the game as tak-
ing place between two voters only, with asymmetrical
voting power and preferences.
The key intuitive property of rational voting behav-
ior with storable votes is evident: the number of
votes cast on a proposal increases monotonically in
intensity.This applies to each individual voter in case
B of our experiment, and to the group as a whole in
case C. As we said earlier, this property is quite gen-
eral and is the main reason why storable votes have
good efficiency properties: by casting more votes
when they care more, voters are more likely to have
their way when it matters most.
Table 2 reports the equilibrium outcomes predicted
by theory with the parameterization we used in the
experiment. The first two rows report the equilibri-
um expected frequency of minority victories, and the
fully efficient frequency, respectively. The third and
fourth rows give the expected share of payoffs for
minority versus majority members, in equilibrium
and with full efficiency respectively.7 The last two
rows describe theoretical gain from storable votes
over simply majority rule.8
In treatment C in equilibrium the minority is expect-
ed to win one quarter of the time; this is less than
efficiency recommends, but obviously much more
than with simple majority voting (when, by defini-
tion, the minority always loses). Similarly, again in
treatment C, in equilibrium a minority member is
expected to have a payoff that is just below 40 per-
cent of a majority member’s payoff; efficiency rec-
ommends a larger share (just above 50 percent), but
again, the payoff is zero with majority voting. In
treatment C, storable votes are not only more
responsive to minorities but sensibly more efficient;
in treatment B, storable votes may come with some
efficiency losses, as they do in this case, but the loss-
es are small in magnitude.
How closely did laboratory behavior conform to
these theoretical predictions? The following figure
summarizes the results. The three panels match the
rows in Table 2. The left panel reports the realized
share of minority victories in the experiments (verti-
cal axis), against the share that would have been
observed, given the experimental intensity draws, if
all subjects had played equilibrium strategies (hori-
zontal axis). Each point corresponds to an experi-
mental session; the light blue points refer to treat-
ment B; the smaller purple points to treatment C, the
larger purple points to treatment C with intra-group
communication, and the yellow points to treatment
C when a single subject represented an entire group.
If all points were on the 45 degree line, observed out-
comes would match the theory perfectly; distance
from the 45 degree line represents deviations from
the theory. The exact coordinates of the different
points allow us to evaluate the results quantitatively,
relative to Table 2, and to identify any treatment
effects. The center panel reports the share of the
aggregate minority payoff to the aggregate majority
payoff, again plotting the laboratory outcomes (ver-
tical axis) against equilibrium predictions (horizon-
tal axis). The right panel graphs the total payoff in
each experimental session against the total payoff
under simple majority rule (i.e., when majority group
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6 In each session, multiple committees were run in parallel, with
random rematching of subjects into committees after each 2-pro-
posal round.
7 Full efficiency is defined here as deciding in favor of the group
with higher total intensity. It guarantees to the committee as a
whole the maximum aggregate payoff the committee could
achieve.
8 The percentage surplus measures are normalized so that full effi-
ciency is 100 and the surplus from random committee decisions is 0.
Table 2
Treatment C B 
% min wins, sv 25 19 
% min wins, efficiency 33 22 
% (min/maj) payoff, sv 38 26 
% (min/maj) payoff, efficiency 52 35 
% surplus sv 60 71 
% surplus majority voting 53 75 
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always wins), both expressed as percentage of poten-
tial surplus.9
The main conclusions from the experiment are clear.
First, observed outcomes were close to equilibrium
predictions: although not to the full extent predicted
by theory, the minority nevertheless wins a substantial
fraction of the times and a substantial share of the
payoff.10 The experiment confirms the potential of
storable votes to empower minorities. Second, the
results reflected treatment effects consistent with the-
ory: in particular, the two light blue circles are below
the other points in the diagrams, suggesting that cohe-
sive minorities with correlated intensities will benefit
the most from storable votes. Similarly, efficiency rel-
ative to majority voting rose in the simple C treat-
ments (the three purple dots above the 45 degree line
in the third panel), and fell slightly in the B treat-
ments (light blue). Third, contrary to our expecta-
tions, efficiency fell in the two modifications of the C
treatment that we had designed to improve coordina-
tion, the yellow dots and the two large purple dots.
Finally, an examination of individual voting behav-
ior reveals that voters did use responsive strategies,
casting more votes when intensity was higher.11
While bonus-vote choices were generally monoton-
ic in intensity, observed behavior was not perfectly
consistent with the equilibrium strategies: minority
members did not always respect the threshold of 50,
and occasionally split their bonus votes over the
two proposals for intermediate intensities; majority
members were particularly likely to split their
votes, even in treatment B, and predictably found
the group equilibrium strategy in treatment C very
difficult. Nevertheless, the monotonicity of voting
behavior was sufficient to produce committee out-
comes very similar to equilibrium outcomes. Other
experiments with storable votes in symmetric envi-
ronments (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey 2006) cor-
roborate this finding, indicating a robustness to
small departures from equilibrium behavior that we
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9 The point denoted by a darker and larger blue circle refers to a
session of the B treatment run, as a robustness check, with nine vot-
ers, with group sizes 5 and 4. As theory predicts, the observed
minority win rate and the relative minority payoff were greater
than in the 3–2 committees.
10 The points in the first two panels are disproportionately below
the 45 degree line, probably because strategic mistakes are much
more costly for the minority than the majority.
11 A full discussion of subjects’ strategies can be found in Casella,
Palfrey and Riezman (2007).
see as an encouraging sign of the practical viability
of the mechanism.
Conclusion
Our theoretical work suggests that storable votes
can be an effective and reasonably efficient way to
enfranchise minority voters. Laboratory experiments
confirm that the mechanism works in practice. Many
questions remain open about the applicability of the
mechanism to less stylized environments, but at this
stage the idea appears promising.
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